What is a Disciple of Jesus?- D Wadsworth

So if you were asked by a young person to make a disciple out of clay what would it look like? What character qualities would it have? How or what would it be doing?

As followers of Jesus Christ we regularly devote ourselves to times of intimacy with God through prayer. Publicly and privately we dedicate ourselves to growing in biblical knowledge, loving, serving others, and forming relationships to share our faith in an active humble lifestyle.

Prays-We regularly devote time to intimacy with God through prayer

prays dependently on a daily basis
overall triumph and fruitfulness from prayer life
convinced of our need for God and the power of a personal prayer life

Worships-We bow, show reverence and adore God

believes worship is an active, holy response toward God
participates in corporate worship of God
combines our head, heart, mind to worship on a personal level

Learns-We grow in biblical knowledge and apply it daily

develop a capacity of inspiration and authority of the Bible
pursue Godly perspective in everyday life and decision making
committed to an ongoing analysis of the Holy Bible

Serves-We unselfishly serve others for God’s glory with a humble lifestyle

deep understanding for the ultimate service of Christ
further God’s kingdom through the use of our giftedness
joyful about meeting others needs
serve God in all areas of life

Loves-We Love God, believers and those who don’t believe

sensitive spirit that enables encouragement toward others
build up others by word and deed
genuine concern to see others be all they can be in Christ
seek opportunities to help those in need

Impacts-We actively form relationships seeking to share our faith by the way we act and live

manages time to prioritize developing solid relationships with the lost within our circle of influence
explain and live the gospel in simple loving ways
deep compassion for the lost
known as a friend of spiritually lost people

Right Answer…Wrong Question

Even during the reign of modern epistemology, there were many anticipations that all was not well. Yet for convenience we may accept the common assessment that postmodern epistemology came to prominence in much of the Western world about 1970. It is usefully analyzed with reference to its rejection or modification of all six of the elements of modern epistemology.

1. Postmodern epistemology continues to fasten on the finite “I”-or, more corporately, on the finite group, the “we.” But it draws very different inferences from this axiom than modern epistemology did. Because all human knowers-or groups of knowers-are finite, they think and reason out of a specific and limited cultural framework, some specific “interpretive community.” I am a white, middle-aged, European Canadian, with a reasonable amount of Western education behind me, and a white-collar job. Surely it is not surprising if I look at things differently than, say, a sub-Saharan African scholar or a twelve-year-old illiterate street prostitute in Bangkok.

2. Reflect deeply on the first point, postmodernism insists, and absolute certainty will no longer be assumed to be possible. To be frank, it is mere illusion, the product of disreputable arrogance. Moreover, absolute certainty is not even desirable. It engenders a narrow outlook and cascading self-righteousness. Surely it is better, postmoderns tell us, to encourage insights that flow from many different perspectives, including different religions and diverse moral codes.

3. Because the “foundations” that we erect are produced by finite human thought, we should abandon the comfortable illusion that they are secure. Postmodernism is profoundly anti-foundationalist.

4. Similarly, as finite human beings we invent our methods, which are themselves shaped by particular languages and cultures and social groupings. Consequently, no method has any deeper significance than the preference or convenience of some particular group. To hold, as modernists did, that to build on a firm foundation with rigorous methods would enable us to uncover truth was self-delusion, for neither our foundations nor our methods transcend our limitations.

5. From these first four points we must infer that whatever “truth” we discover cannot possibly enjoy “ahistorical universality.” It will be true for one culture, but not another; it will be true in one language, but not in another; it will be true for this social grouping, but not for that one. Even in the scientific domain, it is argued, we are learning that large theories are not infrequently overthrown by later theories, that Western medicine has its triumphs and failures while Chinese medicine can make similar claims, and so on. Any claim to have achieved “ahistorical universality” is just one more form of modernist hubris.

6. Many postmodern voices still speak out of the assumptions of philosophical naturalism that are common among late modernist thinkers. Yet substantial numbers of postmoderns are now convinced that there are many, many ways to “knowledge” and “truth”-i.e., to “knowledge” and “truth” that are helpful to you or your “interpretive community.” They will happily applaud traditional science, while anticipating the breakthroughs that will come by “feeling” rather than thinking (“Feel, Luke, feel!”). They accept both astrology and religious claims because they do not take them to be different in kind. Anecdotal evidence is as persuasive to such people as controlled, double-blind scientific experiments. Consequently, many postmoderns think of themselves as more “spiritual” and less “naturalistic” than their modernist forebears.